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[John Ross is a free-lance journalist who has written on Mexican political and economic affairs for
many years.]
President Ernesto Zedillo's government has taken gradual steps toward resuming negotiations in
Chiapas, including an offer to accept all but four points of the disputed accord on Indian sovereignty
negotiated with the Ejercito Zapatista de Liberacion Nacional (EZLN) in February 1996 (see
SourceMex, 02/21/96). As a gesture of goodwill, Zedillo has renewed a pledge to resolve the conflict
without the use of force. But the president's best intentions could be tested by the army, which is
quite capable of disrupting this very tentative drift toward peace.
As an example, the government's offer to accept most of the points in the 1996 accord took almost
one week to reach the EZLN command because the military would not relax its patrols in the area
around the jungle outpost of La Realidad and allow a courier to deliver the message. As of late
February, the EZLN had yet to officially respond to the offer but has demanded that the army pull
back from Zapatista communities before any new talks can be scheduled. Federal troops have
been most active near Prado Pacayal, former headquarters of EZLN spokesperson Subcomandante
Marcos, and La Realidad, public nerve center of Zapatista operations.
On Jan. 7, soldiers ransacked the Morelia ejido on the fourth anniversary of the date the army
stormed the village and executed three local leaders. This incident is cited by human rights groups
as evidence of military impunity. Army invades 55 communities after December massacre Since
January, the army has moved 2,000 fresh troops to the highlands community of Chenalho, close to
the site of the Dec. 22 massacre of 46 Tztotzil Indians. The army used the massacre as an excuse to
invade 55 communities in the highlands. The occupation of these villages is an apparent violation of
the March 1995 Law of Reconciliation, which gives the EZLN the right to bear arms in zones under
its control (see SourceMex, 03/15/95).
Angry villagers in the highlands and the jungles have offered strong resistance to troop movements
in their communities, but this has failed to deter Defense Secretary Gen. Enrique Cervantes.
Speaking to reporters during a swing through the northern states with Zedillo, Cervantes insisted
that a federal firearms law applies to all citizens "with no exceptions," including the EZLN. This has
been interpreted as a clear signal that the military is prepared to forcibly disarm rebel fighters in
Chiapas. To counter criticism, the army has launched a public- relations campaign in the area, using
soldiers to perform "social labor," including cutting hair and fixing household appliances.
The Zedillo administration's failure to curb the military is part of an intricate historical "dance"
between civilian governments and the military. An unwritten rule suggests the president's loyalty
to the military is at least as crucial as the military's loyalty to the president. Since 1994, the dance
floor has been Chiapas. On the heels of the Jan. 1, 1994, uprising, then president Carlos Salinas sent
tens of thousands of troops into the state in response to the EZLN's "declaration of war" against the
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federal government. That largely rhetorical declaration remains the legal justification for the army's
occupation of this southern border state. But despite Salinas's initial impulse to unleash the troops,
he ordered a cease-fire just as the army was poised to pounce on the Zapatistas as they fled into the
jungle. The move further strained relations between the military elite and Salinas, who had ignored
earlier intelligence reports warning of the EZLN's existence and the potential for unrest in Chiapas.
Salinas kept the reports secret to prevent any distractions during negotiations of the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Military holds considerable influence on Zedillo Ernesto
Zedillo, who came to power almost by accident, has been a more acquiescent commander in chief.
Zedillo became the candidate for the governing Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) after
Luis Donaldo Colosio was assassinated in March 1994 (see SourceMex, 03/30/94). But Zedillo came
to power with little support within the PRI, which forced him to cultivate military support. The
president is said to have increased his reliance on the military after the devaluation of the peso
triggered economic collapse only weeks after he took office, a crisis he sought to blame on the
Zapatistas.
The influence of the military on the Zedillo presidency was particularly evident in February 1995,
when 30,000 soldiers were deployed to Chiapas to quash a new EZLN conspiracy to "engage in
new and greater violent" actions. The order included the arrest of EZLN leaders (see SourceMex,
02/15/95). The president later rescinded the order, which was based on flawed military intelligence,
but chose to keep a strong military presence in Chiapas.
The president has ignored repeated demands from local leaders that the troops be removed. The
strong military presence allowed the army to easily expand its hold on the territory following the
Dec. 22 massacre in Acteal. Statistics compiled by nongovernmental organizations suggest that
army troop strength has swelled to 36,000 inside the conflict zone. Almost one-third of the army
encampments are located near Ocosingo, the birthplace of the Zapatista rebellion. The army has
designated Ocosingo the country's 39th military zone. But the expansion of the military has only
intensified the anger of residents in indigenous communities. "The soldiers bring alcohol and
marijuana to our villages, they bring their prostitutes, they foul the water, and they harass the
women," said Tzeltal Indian leader Maria Nunez.
The army has also inherited some roles previously assigned to the corrupt state police forces.
In January, interim Gov. Roberto Albores ordered the brutal and corrupt state police apparatus
dismantled after officers fired into a crowd of Tzeltal and Chol demonstrators in Ocosingo. The
incident, which was filmed by a television network, set off national protests. Dismantling the
state police left the military in charge of state security, a move defended by the governmentaffiliated Comision Nacional de Derechos Humanos (CNDH). "This is not a good time to ask for
demilitarization in Chiapas," said CNDH director Mirielle Roccatti. "There is no police force in the
state." But the increased military presence has led the Zapatista leadership to prepare for an attack.
"This is all we can expect from the government," said Subcomandante Marcos in a written statement
to the Mexican press.
Some nongovernmental organizations raised concerns that the Mexican military would time the
attack to coincide with a US offensive against Iraq to minimize world attention on an attack on the
Zapatistas. The motives for the military expansion in Chiapas are very clear. The principal objective
is to wipe out the EZLN, which could be achieved in a matter of hours. But the military also appears
to be using Chiapas to pressure the Zedillo administration for a greater voice in shaping national
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policies, including the economy. Luis Hernandez Navarro, a former EZLN advisor, compared the
relationship between Zedillo and the military to the Monopoly board game. "The military has
built all its hotels on the strip called Chiapas, where it has placed 50,000 troops," said Hernandez
Navarro. "If Zedillo wants to play, it will cost him a great deal."

-- End --
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